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Abstract—Threats to enterprises have become widespread in the 
last decade. A major source of such threats originates from 
insiders who have legitimate access to the organization’s internal 
systems and databases. Therefore, preventing or responding to 
such incidents has become a challenging task. Digital forensics has 
grown into a de-facto standard in the examination of electronic 
evidence; however, a key barrier is often being able to associate an 
individual to the stolen data. Stolen credentials and the Trojan 
defense are two commonly cited arguments used. This paper 
proposes a model that can more inextricably links the use of 
information (e.g. images, documents and emails) to the individual 
users who use and access them through the use of steganography 
and transparent biometrics. The initial experimental results of the 
proposed approach have shown that it is possible to correlate an 
individual’s biometric feature vector with a digital object (images) 
and still successfully recover the sample even with significant file 
modification. In addition, a reconstruction of the feature vector 
from these unmodified images was possible by using those 
generated imprints with an accuracy of 100% in some scenarios. 
Keywords—Digital forensics; biometrics; grille cipher, data 
leakage; guilty identification. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Insider threats are considered to be a significant security 
issue [1–3]. The recent decade has witnessed countless numbers 
of data loss and exposure incidents all over the world in which 
data has become publicly available and easily accessible [4]. 
The impact of losing or disclosing sensitive data or confidential 
intellectual property might cause substantial financial and 
reputational damage to the company. In particular, when the 
exposure is originated by an authorised individual (i.e. 
employee, contractor, etc.) who misuses their legitimate access, 
the opportunity for adverse impacts is typically greater. Since 
insiders are more likely to bypass some security controls 
compared to outsiders who might have limited knowledge 
about the internal infrastructure [5, 6]. Therefore, insiders pose 
significantly greater threats to organisations than the outsiders 
do. 
One of the aims of the digital forensics process is to produce 
and test a hypothesis about who did what, where and how in 
relation to the incident under investigation. Indeed,  existing 
methods and tools used by investigators to conduct 
examinations of a digital crime significantly help in collecting, 
analysing and presenting the digital evidence [7–9].  However, 
the question of who did the crime is crucial, especially if the 
digital forensics process leads to the presentation of findings in 
a court of law [10]. Therefore, digital forensics investigators 
have to link the identity of a digital object to a human as 
opposed to just using an electronic record or a log that indicates 
a user interacted with the questioned object (evidence). Indeed, 
this is a challenging task, because it is currently difficult for 
digital forensics professionals and investigators to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law that a specific 
human being has used the specific identity of a digital subject 
at a certain time [11–13]. As a possible solution to this 
problem—suggested by the authors of this paper—the use of 
transparent biometrics could provide such a link. Moreover, 
transparently capturing the user’s biometrics and instantly 
generating a biometric imprint that correlates the user 
interaction with the used object could give rise to important 
information, which would help investigators answer the 
question “who?”. 
This paper introduces a proactive framework that uses 
transparent biometrics to aid digital forensic investigators in 
their analysis of electronic evidence. Furthermore, it examines 
the feasibility of linking a subject (computer user) with an 
object of interest such as images, documents, or emails. In 
addition, this investigation develops a set of experiments that 
employ a grille cipher to link embed the transparent biometric 
sample. Unlike most existing methods such as digital 
watermarking or null ciphers (form of encryption where the 
plaintext is mixed with a large amount of non-cipher material) 
the integrity of the object is modified [14, 15], a grille cipher 
employs a template that is used to cover the carrier message; 
the words that appear in the openings of the template are the 
hidden message. Further, the proposed approach only 
“imprints” the object with any given data (i.e. user’s biometric 
feature vector). Therefore, the employed imprinting process can 
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be described as a correlation of the feature vector with the 
object. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II 
highlights the related work in the area of guilt identification and 
proactive digital forensics. Section III introduces the proposed 
approach, including the core process. Section IV explains the 
experimental methodology of different types of attack vectors 
to evaluate the robustness of the proposed method. Section V 
presents the experimental results. Section VI covers the 
discussion for the findings and possible future works. Finally, 
the paper concludes in Section VII. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A variety of studies have examined the possibility of 
identifying the person that leaked data [16–19]. In [16] the 
authors investigated the feasibility of inserting fake objects into 
data of interest for the purpose of distributing these data to third 
party agents. The idea was to add a unique object into the data 
prior to handing it out to those agents. However, adding these 
fake objects is not always possible. For example, in the case of 
medical records, manipulating the data or injecting invalid 
information could lead to huge risk and consequences on the 
patients’ life. The examination of the feasibility of their method 
found that it is better in identifying the source of the data 
leakage compared to the simple data allocation algorithms. 
Moreover, 95% of confidence was obtained via their 
experiments. 
Subsequent practical implementations of the guilt model 
published in [17–19] resulted in the development of several 
prototype models. All of these models use the same concept 
introduced in [16] by inserting unique fake objects or digital 
watermarks to the data prior to the distribution. In general, the 
data creator (in this case the distributer) is responsible for 
generating and embedding the fake objects. However, in many 
cases the data can be created by an insider who leaks the 
sensitive data by himself. In additional, the fake object creation 
process could be a complicated task. 
From a forensic prospective, [20] proposed a system that 
proactively and continuously collects evidence by creating and 
storing file signatures that are deleted, edited, or copied within 
computers on the local network. The system uses a centralized 
database to store the generated objects’ signatures, which 
provide significant information, such as user identifier, object 
time stamp, and type of the event. For instance, events like file 
creation or deletions, user identifier, file name, file path, a time 
stamp for the event, and a machine identifier. This is helpful 
especially when conducting a forensic activity. The generated 
fingerprints are equal to ~1.06 percent of the original file size, 
which is a huge reduction in terms of storage space. Further, the 
system supports several file types, such as Microsoft Word 
documents and Portable Document Formats (PDF). For the 
deployment, the system requires patching the system kernel in 
order to intercept system calls. Unfortunately, such low level 
kernel hardcoding is limited to open source operating systems. 
In contrast, our proposed approach does not require any 
modification on the kernel level. 
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
The proposed framework consists of two engines: 
biometrics and a grille cipher engine. The biometrics engine 
transparently captures and extracts the user’s biometric samples 
(e.g. facial features, keystroke analysis, behavioural profiling) 
and stores them in a database on the user’s computer. The grille 
cipher engine retrieves the object metadata and its Hex 
representations and requests the latest user’s biometric feature 
vector from the biometric engine to be used in the imprinting 
process. Finally, these generated imprints are stored in a 
centralized database for later analysis when required. Fig. 1 
illustrates the framework architecture for the proactive 
biometric-enabled forensic imprinting system. 
Upon the detection of data leakage, the object (whether it be 
posted on a public website or captured by the network) can be 
analysed for the biometric imprint. The sample is extracted and 
then processed by a biometric system in order to determine the 
last user who interacted with the object as presented in Fig. 2. 
The generation process of the imprints is inspired by the 
benefits of employing the grille cipher technique. Grille ciphers 
has been used in the past (prior to the modern null ciphers) as a 
means for transferring/exchanging secret messages between 
two parties. It was originally used to extract hidden messages 
from plain text by mapping the text throughout a pierced sheet 
or such a cardboard. For instance, the words “secret” and “plan” 
can be extracted from a letter puzzle by applying appropriate 
cardboards that map the desired locations of the letters, as Fig. 
3 illustrates. Therefore, the embedded secret message can be 
retrieved by mapping specific locations. Hence, applying the 
same technique to imprint the biometric feature vector to an 
object file is possible, where the object can be an image file, 
document, video, or any digital file types. In order to adapt the 
grill cipher technique to the proposed approach, it involves 
several consecutive steps, as follows: 
1) Preparation of Feature Vector and Object: 
The preparation step converts both feature vector and object 
into its Hex representations for the mapping purpose. In 
addition, the index of each character is preserved during this 
conversion, which begins with ‘0’ for the first character and 
ascendingly continues until the last one. Furthermore, the 
process of conversion is not necessarily achieved by 
transforming each character, since reading the whole object in 
binary mode allows for low-level representations of both Hex 
and Binary. However, still character-by-character (or byte-by-
byte) indexing is required in order to generate the object index 
list. 
2) Mapping the Feature Vector with the Object: 
After obtaining the Hex representations of the feature vector 
and object, each Hex value in the feature vector are mapped 
with its equivalent positions in the object’s Hexes to retrieve   
the   possible   positions   where   both   are   match.  
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Fig. 1.  The Proposed framework architecture 
 
Fig. 2. The process of identifying an individual 
 
Accordingly, the mapping process returns lists of indexes for 
those matched Hexes. 
 
3) Generating the Feature Vector Imprints: 
By retrieving the positions of each character of the feature 
vector with the object, now it is possible to generate the 
imprints based on the list of indexes, which means that multi- 
imprints of the whole feature vector can be generated by 
combining those positions. 
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Fig. 3. Grille cipher 
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The pseudocode of the imprinting process starting from the 
preparation is illustrated below in Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1: imprinting algorithm: 
Input: Feature Vector (FV), Object (O) 
Output: Imprints 
1: function PREP (FV, O) 
2:           for each value in FV & O: 
3:                      Convert FV, O into its HEX representations 
4:                      Retrieve the index of each value 
5:            Return FVHEX, index, OHEX, index 
6: function MAPPING (FVHEX, index, OHEX, index) 
7:           for each value in FVHEX, OHEX: 
8:                                 index (Oindex) ← FVHEX  ⋂ OHEX 
9:                 Return index (Oindex) 
10: function IMPRINTING (indexes ) 
11:            imprint ← Combine unique indexes from the 
12:            retrieved index list 
13:            Return imprints 
 
The following example explains how this algorithm works 
in practice. For the demonstration purpose, assume that the 
following feature vector needs to be mapped into an object as 
presented in Fig. 4.  
 
Fig. 4. Feature vector and an object 
Regardless of the file type of the object, since any file type 
can be transformed and treated as a Hex representation. The 
first step in the proposed algorithm is to convert both of the 
feature vector and object into its Hex representations. 
According to the ASCII table, Fig. 5 shows the converted 
characters as Hex alongside the position of each value (index). 
In this example, each value of the feature vector exists in more 
than one location within the object. For example, “30” (the Hex 
representation of “0”) is located in positions 0, 6, and 12. In the 
same manner, the mapping process continues for all subsequent 
feature vector’s values until all possible positions are retrieved.  
In addition, Table 1 presents the retrieved positions for each 
value of the feature vector. 
TABLE 1: FEATURE VECTOR VALUES POSITIONS IN THE 
OBJECT 
Original Value Hex Representation Positions in the object 
0 30 0, 6, 12 
1 31 1, 7, 13 
2 32 2, 8, 14 
3 33 3, 9, 15 
4 34 4, 10, 16 
5 35 5, 11, 17 
The last step in this example is to generate all possible 
imprints from those retrieved positions. Since each feature 
vector value is located in three different locations, the total 
unique imprints that can be generated from these positions are 
three as listed in Table 2. Therefore, using any value of these 
imprints, it is possible to reconstruct the original feature vector 
from the object by reversing the mapping process. After 
explaining how the imprinting technique works through the 
given example, the next section investigates the feasibility of 
imprinting biometric feature vectors with images and later 
recovering they (even after object modification). 
TABLE 2: POSSIBLE IMPRINTS 
Imprint number Imprint 
1 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
2 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
3 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY 
The main goal of the experiment is to assess the feasibility 
of the proposed hypothesis where the subject’s feature vector 
can be forensically linked and retrieved from an object of 
interest. Therefore, it is critical to evaluate its performance in a 
complex, subject-related manner. In total, four experiments 
were conducted as follows: 
 The first experiment retrieves the feature vector from 
the original imprinted image. 
 The second experiment examines the situation where 
the image is modified in one area with an increasing 
proportion of modification. 
 The third experiment verifies the case where the image 
was modified in several areas.  
 The final experiment investigates when only parts of 
the original image are available, while the rest is 
missing. 
In these experiments, the used feature vector presents a real 
facial feature vector sample with a length of 57 numeric 
characters, as illustrated in Fig. 6. The length of the vector relies 
upon the used feature extraction algorithm to compute the 
feature vector. In this study, Fisherfaces algorithm is used to 
compute the feature vector for the captured users’ faces images 
[21]. In addition, the algorithm performs a Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and Linear Discriminant Analysis 
(LDA) for dimensionality reduction [22].  
Regarding the used objects in the performed experiments, 
the UCID image dataset version 2 is used [23]. It contains a total 
of 1,300 images with two sizes, either (1,234 x 1,858) or (1,858 
x 1,234) width, height in pixels respectively. For the purpose of 
this study, only the first 100 images are used from this dataset, 
since it is assumed that this number is enough for the purpose 
of evaluation. The implementation of the proposed algorithm 
was developed in Python due to its flexibility in terms of list 
comprehension and image processing. Moreover, Python’s 
built-in library has several useful functions, such as map and zip 
which facilitate many relevant operations [24]. As regards the 
deployment, these tests have been conducted on a machine with 
FV: [012345] 
O: [012345012345012345] 
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 FV 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 𝐻𝑒𝑥(𝐹𝑉) 30 31 32 33 34 35 
 𝐻𝑒𝑥(𝐹𝑉)𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
O 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 
𝐻𝑒𝑥(𝑂) 30 31 32 33 34 35 30 31 32 33 34 35 30 31 32 33 34 35 
𝐻𝑒𝑥(𝑂)𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Fig. 5. The Hex representation of the feature vector and the object 
 
Fig. 6. Facial feature vector 
Microsoft Windows 7, Intel Core i5 2.70GHz and RAM 4.00 
GB. 
A. Retrieving the Feature Vector from the Original 
Imprinted Image 
The aim of this experiment is to imprint the feature vector 
as many times as possible with each image in the dataset. The 
first experiment examines the possibility of generating the 
imprints between the feature vector and the used object. Since 
there is a high probability that the subject or other party (for 
intentional or unintentional reasons) somehow could modify 
the questioned object after it is imprinted, therefore, in the 
subsequent experiments investigates the accuracy of retrieving 
the feature vector from the object under several situations.  
B. Modification in One Area 
Experiment two evaluates the imprinting mechanism after 
the image is modified by a different percentage. The simulation 
of this is performed by randomly choosing a section of the 
image as a rectangle box at a growing size to reflect an 
increasing proportion of modification. In addition, equation 1 is 
used to determine the size and the random position of the 
modified section. The equation takes three variables, which are: 
 w: image width, 
 l: image height, 
 s: the desired modification percentage. 
The equation gives four values; x and y are random values 
between (0, image width) and (0, image height) respectively. 
These set the top left pixel position of the modified rectangle 
(as presented in red colour in Fig. 7). The third and fourth values 
are for the right down corner of the rectangle (as presented in 
blue colour). 
𝑃(𝑤,𝑙,𝑠) = ∑  ∑(𝑥, 𝑦,
𝑙−1
𝑦=0
 𝑥 +
𝑤
10 ∙ √𝑠
, 𝑦 +
𝑙
10 ∙ √𝑠
 )
𝑤−1
𝑥=0
          (1) 
In this experiment, the imprinted images have been 
modified by 5% increments, which means that the first 
alteration rate is 5% then 10%, 15% and so forth, until reaching 
100%. Fig. 8 demonstrates some samples of an image modified 
in different rates. The upper left image is modified by 5% of its 
original size, where the rest are modified at rates of 35%, 65%, 
and 95% respectively. 
C. Modification in Multi Areas 
The third experiment is similar to the previous one, except 
that the modifications occur in several parts of the image 
instead of an increasing proportion of one area. This type of 
attack is more influential since various and random parts of the 
image are affected by such alterations. In order to simulate such 
modifications, the dataset images are altered using multiple 
rectangle boxes, each of which is equal to 1% of the total image 
size. Therefore, simulating 5% randomly locations alteration, it 
would need five of these boxes among an image. In addition, 
this experiment assesses the proposed technique with an 
alteration size on the objects by 5% increments of its original 
size. Fig. 9 illustrates four sample images modified by 5%, 
35%, 65%, and 95% respectively.  
D. Image Partial 
Further investigation was needed to better understand the 
effects of different attack vectors on retrieving the imprinted 
feature vector. Therefore, the last experiment in this study is 
interesting in terms of the obtained results. It simulates the 
scenario, where only part of the imprinted image is available 
and the rest is missing; for instance, the imprinted image could 
be resized or cropped. To simulate such alterations, a random 
section of the images in the dataset was cropped in different 
sizes, starting from 5% of the original size, and then in each 
subsequent test, again a random section was cropped with an 
increment of 5%. Fig. 10 illustrates some of these cropped 
samples.   
V. RESULTS 
In this study, the aim is to critically assess the hypothesis of 
linking a subject’s biometric feature vector to an object of 
interest using the grille cipher technique. In average, it takes 
only ~3 milliseconds to generate an imprint with size average 
of those imprints is less than ~472 bytes per imprint. The result 
of experiment one shows that the average number of the 
generated imprints are 854 per image. While the minimum 
number of imprints in a single image was 244, and the 
maximum is 1,815. This means that the mapped feature vector 
could be retrieved and reconstructed from any of these imprints. 
This achieved number of imprints is not surprising, since the 
feature vector always contains numerical values (0-9). 
Therefore, there are many matches between the feature vector 
and  those  images’  Hex values.  In addition,  a reconstruction  
[1679.2235398,-1555.40390834,-1140.07728186,-1999.85500108] 
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Fig. 9. Sample of a modified multiple parts of an image Fig. 10. Samples of a cropped image in certain percentage 
 
of the feature vector from these unmodified images were 
possible by using those generated imprints with an accuracy of 
100%. This was achieved easily by reversing the imprinting 
processes. 
In the second experiment, it was found that this imprinting 
technique is very effective, since the imprinted feature vector is 
successfully retrieved from an average of 97 out of 100 images 
even when the modification percentage is 80%, as Fig. 11 
illustrates. However, after a modification of 80% on the images, 
the number of valid retrieved feature vector significantly drops 
due to the loss of most of the imprints values across those 
images. This decline occurred for the reason that critical set of 
mapped indexes values are changed after such high 
modification rate. Yet, it is clearly illustrated that it is feasible 
to reconstruct the feature vector from the imprinted objects even 
though the huge destruction to its original values. 
In the third experiment where the modification took a place 
in multiple areas, the result shows that the imprinted feature 
vector are successfully retrieved, even when the images are 
altered in more sophisticated way than the one area 
modification attack (experiment two). Fig. 12 exhibits the 
percentage of images where the feature vector was successfully 
retrieved. Since changing certain pixels’ values-by printing 
those black boxes- after the imprinting process with the feature 
vector consequently affects the mapped indexes’ values. 
Therefore, many of the imprints became useless after such 
attack. Despite massive destruction on the image visualisation 
with the increased rate of the modification, it is possible to 
recapture the feature vector from some of those images, even 
under enormous alteration such as when the object is changed 
by 95%. At the same time, this attack caused a major loss of the 
mapped indexes values comparing to the modification in one 
area experiment. Where the latter is less vandalism than the 
former in terms of impacting the interested pixels. 
Finally, in the last experiment the most striking finding to 
emerge from the results is that among all these tests in this 
experiment, the feature vector is retrieved and reassembled 
100% among all the tested images. This means that by giving  
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Fig. 11. % of images with successful retrieved feature vectors 
under one area modification attack 
Fig. 12. % of images with successful retrieved feature vectors 
under multiple parts modification attack 
 
 
Fig. 13. % of images with successful retrieved feature vectors 
under partial image attack 
Fig. 14. Performance under partial image attack 
only part of the original imprinted image, it is possible to restore 
the feature vector to its original values. Fig. 13 shows the 
percentage of the successful retrieved feature vector under the 
partial image attack. In addition, the results in Fig. 14 also show 
that the average, maximum, and minimum numbers of a 
retrieved feature vector cross on all examined images (i.e. 100 
images). However, these results were obtained by assuming that 
the preserved indexes of the hexes of interest are not changed 
after the cropping process. This means that all of the imprints 
in the database are correlated with the questioned samples as a 
part of the original images. In practice this is not always 
possible since the original object might not be accessible or 
available after the imprinting process took a place. Therefore, 
more research is needed to find a link between such parts of an 
object and the original.  
VI. DISCUSSION 
The nature of the imprinting process reveals no information 
about where to locate the imprinted object–thereby making it 
particularly challenging to recover or modify–as illustrated in 
the experiments that have been conducted. In addition, the 
results have evidently shown that by mapping the Hex 
representations of a feature vector with the Hex representations 
of an image of interested, it is feasible to generate one or more 
imprints of this feature vector. The first conducted experiment 
results revealed an ‘expected’ outcome by imprinting the 
feature vector from the original imprinted image. Since 100% 
of the imprinted feature vector is retrieved using only the 
generated imprints that contains the indexes of the 
corresponding positions, it is expected because the mapped 
objects (images in this case) have not been exposed to any kind 
of alteration and, therefore, were tested based on their original 
status. The explanation of being able to score those high results 
is attributed to the nature of the examined object. Since images 
are a set of pixels that range from 0 to 255, changing one pixel’s 
value does not affect other pixels’ values, or their position. 
Thus, altering part of the image is not necessary, as it affects all 
imprinted indexes’ values. Therefore, generating as many 
imprints as possible in various positions of the image, this in 
turn will increase the probability of successfully retrieving the 
imprinted values. 
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It is worth to mention that the approach introduced in this 
paper could be applied to other types of objects such as Office 
Word documents and PDF files. Nevertheless, the results do not 
necessarily reflect a robust success rate, since those types of 
objects are considered a binary format for storing a document. 
In addition, an initial experiment was carried out where a small 
set of Office Word and PDF files are examined using the same 
imprinting technique that was conducted on images. The results 
showed that unlike images, the dynamic nature of binary files 
makes changing a small value in the document/file content 
require recompiling the whole binary file, which consequently 
leads to adjustment of the whole indexes sequence. For that 
reason, many attacks would considerably impact the accuracy 
of retrieving the imprinted feature vector from such objects. 
Therefore, further work needs to be undertaken to ensure the 
biometric capturing, processing and imprinting systems need to 
be hardened against attack and modification in order for the 
approach to remain valid. 
Nevertheless, these findings provide interesting insights for 
future research, where other techniques could be investigated 
for robust object alteration. In addition, a possible solution 
could tackle such issue is instead of mapping the feature vector 
with the object at a Hex level, a higher level of representation 
could be used. For instance, in the case of documents, mapping 
the feature vector with static representations of the document’s 
text possibly will become less vulnerable to such alteration 
attack, especially when the generated imprints preserve more 
static values related to the object.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper proposed a proactive framework that uses 
transparent biometrics to inextricably link the use of 
information (e.g., images, documents) to the individual users 
who use and access them rather than intermediate controls. 
Such approach aids digital forensic investigators in their 
analysis of an electronic evidence and could increases the 
likelihood of the evidence to be admissible in a court of law. 
The results of all the conducted experiments show that even 
when the object is altered in a sophisticated way, there is still a 
chance to retrieve and reconstruct the imprinted feature vector. 
From a privacy prospective, such an approach would require 
modifications to the relevant employee computer use policy, 
thus to make them aware that such a system was operating and 
what was happening to their biometric information. 
Despite these promising results, the use of transparent 
biometrics to monitor and acquire subject’s traits introduces 
several challenges that need to be considered when developing 
such a system. For instance, in the case of facial detection, the 
environmental and external factors such as light, subject 
distance from the camera and face orientation significantly 
affect the accuracy of the obtained samples. Even with 
extensive research being undertaken in this field, such issues 
cannot be overcome very easily, especially when the operation 
of transparent biometric monitoring is meant to be unobtrusive 
and unsupervised.  
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